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OF SAILING SHIPS AND SEEKING
FACTS: BRIEF REFLECTIONS ON
MAGISTRATES AND THE FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
JACK B. WEINSTEIN*
JONATHAN B. WIENER**
Building a system of procedure is a little like designing and
building a new ship. The old ships are in need of repair. Clever
designers invent a new ship, sleeker, swifter, able to cut through
treacherous seas and reach their destinations more rapidly and
more safely than the old ships. But she too begins to age: the paint
fades, barnacles attach to the hull, leaks are discovered, and newly
invented devices must be fitted to prevent her obsolescence. After
a time the ship is so encumbered with stop-gap repairs, and so
laden with piecemeal adaptations, that it takes a trained eye to
discern her original design.
A new system of procedure has a life with some of the same
patterns. As the system matures, new problems arise and are often
dealt with by amending or interpreting the rules in new and un-
foreseen directions. The system becomes an amalgam of its initial
structure and the various adaptive appendages it has grown or had
tacked on. After a while, the structure no longer adequately sup-
ports its appendages, or an impending social sea-change makes it
appear inadequate to the task, and major refitting or a new struc-
ture becomes desirable.
In this Article we will discuss the evolution of two important
components of the now fifty-year-old system under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure: first, the basic design of the 1938 Rules, a
great expansion in discretion and procedural power that the Rules
accorded the federal judiciary; and, second, a new post-1938 depar-
ture, the substantial and increasing delegation of authority to fed-
eral magistrates. These two features play a critical role in shaping
* Judge, United States District Court, Eastern District of New York; Adjunct Professor
of Law, Columbia University School of Law.
** J.D. 1987, Harvard Law School; law clerk to the Honorable Jack B. Weinstein.
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modern federal litigation. Without them, our present federal trial
court system would look quite different.
It seems obvious that the original drafters could not have fore-
seen the huge expansion of federal litigation and its enormous
complexity. Yet, like the Constitution, whose anniversary we have
just celebrated, there was enough flexibility and sensible design in
the original Rules to meet new problems. In the Eastern District of
New York we have met the new demands in part by expanding the
size of the court from six authorized judges and no magistrates, in
1938, to twelve authorized judges, four senior judges, and five full-
time magistrates in 1988. In large measure, as indicated below,
power to control pretrial stages has been shifted to the magistrates,
who have been clothed with some of the discretion of Article III
judges. The growth of the magistrates as a critical component of
the federal courts has not yet been fully appreciated by those not
engaged in daily litigation. Further discussion of this phenomenon
in procedural literature is warranted.
UNIFORM FEDERAL RULES
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure replaced over a century
of procedural disarray with a uniform, well-considered plan. Before
these Rules, the federal courts followed separate procedures in ac-
tions at law and actions at equity. In actions at law, federal proce-
dure was governed by the Conformity Act of 1872,1 which generally
required the application of the contemporaneous procedure of the
state in which the federal court sat. But state procedures were
often complex and pedantic, requiring special pleadings, recogniz-
ing narrow forms of action, and strewing the litigation path with
numerous technical obstacles. Mid-nineteenth century attempts to
simplify state procedure, such as the Field Code in New York, al-
though initially successful, were eventually defeated by legislative
tinkering and judicial reinterpretations.2
Our current rules for civil procedure in the federal courts were
born in a wave of dissatisfaction with then-current design that
started rising in the first decade of this century and finally swept
in with the New Deal. The fierce and lengthy struggle began in the
early 1900s when a group of luminaries-notably Roscoe Pound,
Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, §§ 5-6, 17 Stat. 196, 197.
See Weinstein & Distler, Comments on Procedural Reform: Drafting Pleading Rules,
57 COLUM. L. REV. 518, 520-21 (1957).
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William Howard Taft, and Thomas Shelton-began pressing for
reforms of federal procedure.' They began by planning one set of
federal rules for all actions at law.4 The reformers soon urged that
all cases in law and equity be merged into one uniform system of
equity-based federal procedural rules.5
The chief opponent of reform was Senator Thomas Walsh of
Nebraska. His vigorous and agile tactics stymied the attempts of
the early reformers to gain passage of the Rules Enabling Act, the
bill that would permit uniform federal rules. Walsh opposed uni-
form federal procedure on the powerful ground that most lawyers,
having local practices, were better off with federal courts following
local procedure. By 1933, the reformers had effectively given up
hope.' President Roosevelt's newly appointed Attorney General
Homer Cummings, however, proved to be the savior of uniform na-
tional procedure. With Cummings' support, the bill sped through
Congress, and on June 19, 1934, the Rules Enabling Act became
law.7
Ironically, the liberal New Dealers had swiftly and decisively
accomplished in one stroke what the conservatives-Pound, Taft,
and the ABA-had been desperately and futilely sponsoring since
1906. The conservatives had proposed uniform equity-based proce-
dure because they sought to allow judges to reach the merits of
cases directly, without technical barriers. Through streamlined
procedure, they hoped to restore faith in the judiciary, which they
saw eroding as litigants became frustrated with elaborate but use-
less pleading rules, forms of action, and the like." The liberals
stayed in the background of the debate until the 1930s, when the
3 See Weinstein, The Ghost of Process Past: The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and Erie, 54 BRooKLYN L. REv. 1, 6-9 (1988).
4 See Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1015, 1069-71
(1982); Chandler, Some Major Advances in the Federal Judiciary System, 1922-1947, 31
F.R.D. 307, 479-83 (1963).
See Weinstein, supra note 3, at 9-10. The reformers eventually decided to apply the
concepts of the Federal Equity Rules of 1912 to all forms of action. See Subrin, How Equity
Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective,
135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 943-61 (1987).
1 See Weinstein, supra note 3, at 10-11. By 1933 many of the original reformers, includ-
ing Shelton, had died. Newly elected President Roosevelt quickly wiped out what little hope
was left by appointing none other than Thomas Walsh as his first Attorney General. But
events suddenly, and completely unexpectedly, changed direction when Walsh died on his
way to Washington.
7 Rules Enabling Act, ch. 651, §§ 1-2, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2072 (1982)); see Weinstein, supra note 3, at 15-16.
' See Subrin, supra note 5, at 956-61.
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New Dealers saw in uniform federal procedure an opportunity to
prepare the federal courts for the coming boom in federal
legislationY
Once the Rules Enabling Act had been passed, the Supreme
Court began designing the new Rules. At first, Chief Justice
Hughes proposed that the new set of Rules be for actions at law
only, leaving the Federal Equity Rules of 1912 in place. But an
article published by Dean Charles Clark and Professor James
Moore of Yale Law School in January 193510 urged a merger of law
and equity, and in February, former Attorney General William
Mitchell made the same point in a letter to the Chief Justice."
Mitchell's letter persuaded Hughes to change his mind; the Chief
Justice announced his new policy favoring a merged system on
May 9, 1935.12
In June 1935, the Supreme Court appointed an Advisory Com-
mittee of fourteen experts to help prepare the new Federal Rules.
The Committee was chaired by William Mitchell, and its reporter
was Dean Clark, later a judge of the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals. Other members included Scott Loftin of Florida, the Presi-
dent of the ABA; George Wickersham, the President of the Ameri-
can Law Institute; Edgar Tolman, a distinguished attorney from
Chicago; and Professor Edson Sunderland of the University of
Michigan Law School.'" Two other members, George Donworth
and Warren Olney, Jr., had been judges. 14
Clark and the other reformers believed it wise to merge all
civil actions under a system modeled after the equity procedure.
The new uniform federal procedure would be flexible, giving judges
substantial discretion and avoiding technical maneuvers. The com-
mittee favored broad discovery and joinder, so that an entire dis-
pute could be placed before the judge at once. By 1938, it was
quite clear, as Professor Subrin reminds us, that "[e]quity [had]
See id. at 969.
10 Clark & Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure: L The Background, 44 YALE L.J.
387 (1935). It was soon followed by Clark & Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure: II.
Pleadings and Parties, 44 YALE L.J. 1291 (1935).
" See Chandler, supra note 4, at 489-90.
1 See id. at 490 ("there seems little doubt that it was the letter that caused" Hughes'
change of mind).
13 See Supreme Court Adopts Rules for Civil Procedure in Federal District Courts, 24
A.B.A. J. 97, 97-98 (1938) (listing committee members); Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory
Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 499 n.24 (1986) (same).
" See Subrin, supra note 5, at 971 n.369.
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conquered common law."'15 Dean Clark declared that the new Fed-
eral Rules were intended to follow "the uniform equity rules of
1912" which "embodied... about the best of English and Ameri-
can procedure of the day.'1 6 Edgar Tolman wrote: "The Federal
Equity Rules are the backbone of the procedure.'
17
The Advisory Committee drafted the new Rules and the Su-
preme Court adopted them in essentially the form we know today.
The Court transmitted the Rules to the Attorney General in De-
cember 1937, and Congress received them in early 1938. The Ena-
bling Act had provided that rejection of the Rules would require
concurrent action by both houses of Congress. Although there was
some lingering opposition in the Senate, it faded in the face of the
House's approval, and the Rules became operative on September
16, 1938.18
The centerpiece of the Rules was the discretion given to the
federal judges to control cases. Federal district judges have almost
absolute power to run civil cases as they see fit: to determine
schedules, to gather all the necessary parties, to define the scope of
discovery, and to structure trials. The rules restricting intermedi-
ate appeals'" insulate the federal district judge from most outside
interference. It is probably the free availability of intermediate and
interlocutory appeals to the Appellate Division, rather than the
Id. at 909; see also id. at 961-73 (discussing key figures in growth of doctrine).
16 Chandler, supra note 4, at 499.
17 Id. (quoting Hearing on the Rules of Civil Procedure Before the House Judiciary
Comm., 75th Cong., 2d Sess. 73 (1938)).
"B See id. at 505-12. The new Federal Rules had a profound impact on state procedure
as well. Even those states which did not adopt the federal practice in toto, such as New
York, modified or replaced their old systems in order to take advantage of the innovations
in the Federal Rules. See, e.g., Weinstein, Proposed Revision of New York Civil Practice, 60
COLUM. L. REV. 50 (1960) (discussing reforms); Weinstein & Bergman, New York Procedures
to Obtain Information in Civil Litigation, 32 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1066 (1957) (discussing reforms
of New York's discovery rules); Weinstein, Gleit & Kay, Procedures for Obtaining Informa-
tion Before Trial, 35 TEx. L. REv. 481 (1957) (surveying relationship of states' discovery
reforms to federal reforms).
" See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291-1292 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The evolution of what is an
appealable order demonstrates that even today, vestigial distinctions between actions at law
and actions at equity are still being laboriously excised. In Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v.
Mayacamas Corp., 108 S. Ct. 1133 (1988), the Supreme Court at long last overruled the
narrow Enelow-Ettelson doctrine of appealability. Justice Marshall described the doctrine
as "outmoded" and "a total fiction," "hopelessly unworkable" in our modern merged proce-
dure, and he relied in part on an opinion Charles Clark wrote in 1942. See id. at 1140-41.
Other threats to the independence of federal trial judges nevertheless persist. See, e.g.,
Weinstein, The Limited Power of the Federal Courts of Appeals to Order a Case Reas-
signed to Another District Judge, 120 F.R.D. 267 (1988).
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differences in the written rules and statutes, that account most for
the sharp differences between federal and New York pretrial
practice.2 °
When a federal district employs an individual assignment cal-
endar, as is done in the Eastern District of New York, a district
judge is permitted virtually unfettered discretion to direct the
course of the litigation before final judgment. The drafters thought
that this power would enable federal judges to proceed straight to
the merits of cases. By combining actions at law and actions at
equity under one equity-style procedure, they meant to reduce
proceduralisms and facilitate substantive decisions. They were per-
suaded that this transformation would be more likely to do justice
between the parties, where the old system had often been frustrat-
ing and unfair and sometimes incomprehensible. As a corollary,
they were impressed that the new procedural system would nur-
ture burgeoning new national legislation. They believed that fed-
eral litigation should attend to important questions of social pol-
icy, not simply the disagreement between the two parties.2 The
Rules were clearly aimed at fostering this kind of public-oriented
legal decision-making.
The Supreme Court's contemporaneous decision in Erie Rail-
road v. Tompkins22 had a related effect of clearing the federal
courts' decks in preparation for the large volume of nationally-ori-
ented litigation that was about to consume their dockets. 23 In con-
cert, the new Rules and Erie turned much federal litigation upside
down: the Rules freed the federal courts from local procedure, and
Erie freed them from local substantive lawmaking.24 The federal
20 See 7 J. WEINSTEIN, H. KORN & A. MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE 1 5701.03
(1988) (New York "represents an extreme position among American jurisdictions allowing
appeals" from intermediate orders).
21 See Subrin, supra note 5, at 966-69.
22 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
23 This argument is made in greater detail in Weinstein, supra note 3, at 20.
2 While the Rules erased the distinction between law and equity, Erie reaffirmed the
distinction between procedure and substance. This latter distinction, and its problems, per-
sist today. See, e.g., Arguments Before the Court, 56 U.S.L.W. 3635 (U.S. Mar. 22, 1988)
("half a century after the court decided [Erie], the federal courts are still struggling to dis-
tinguish between matters of substance and matters of procedure") (discussing argument in
Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2239 (1988)). The Court in Stewart faced the
question of "whether state or federal law governs the enforceability of a forum selection
clause in a contract between two private parties," id., because enforcement of contract pro-
visions is ordinarily a matter of substantive law while correct venue is considered proce-
dural. The Stewart Court ultimately determined that the federal venue statute, 28 U.S.C. §
1404(a) (1982), as a procedural housekeeping rule, controls the effect of the forum-selection
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courts entered a new era in which national problems became a
more important aspect of their work.
Our modern array of cherished civil liberties is in part the re-
.sult of this procedural realignment. The federal courts were
opened to the aggrieved by the simpler pleading rules, the straight-
forward route to the merits, the opportunity for broad discovery,
and the ability to join numerous parties or bring class actions. The
broad discretion given to federal judges has also enabled them to
move cases expeditiously and thereby keep the courts available for
new claims. Since 1938, the federal courts have steered one of the
main engines of justice,25 helping us to shape our liberties and
adapt to the evolving values of a changing society. Without the
Rules and Erie, appropriate remedies for many of our systematic
ills could never have been fashioned. 6 We owe at least part of our
achievements in civil rights, as in several other fields of national
law, to the visionaries who fought for and designed the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
Yet, the years of the federal system's predominance in sub-
stantive reform may be ending. Changes in the federal procedural
system, and particularly changes in the views of those appointed to
the federal bench in recent years, have shifted more and more re-
sponsibility for progressive jurisprudence, in both private and pub-
lic law, to the states. It is still too early to determine whether this
tendency reflects a merely passing perturbation or a basic shift in
clause. See 108 S. Ct. at 2245.
25 Cf. Chayes, How Does the Constitution Establish Justice?, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1026
(1988) (arguing that framers of Constitution intended federal judiciary to exercise political
power to establish justice).
2' Cases in which judicial discretion made possible systemic remedies include Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
217 We cannot know whether all the conservatives who battled for the Rules Enabling
Act would have approved the civil rights advances as heartily as did the liberals who drafted
the Rules. In their time, the "conservatives" were ardent reformers. Roscoe Pound's 1906
speech to the American Bar Association in St. Paul, Minnesota, advocating sweeping proce-
dural reform, made him seem "a flaming rebel against the legal establishment." Gossett,
Segal & Smith, Foreword to THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE Fu-
TURE at 7 (A. Levin & R. Wheeler eds. 1979). In 1937, Wigmore called the speech Roscoe
Pound's St. Paul Address of 1906: The Spark that Kindled the White Flame of Progress,
20 J. AM. JUDICATURE Soc'y 176 (1937), and by the 1960s, Pound's 1906 speech was "almost
universally considered to be the most influential paper ever written by an American legal
scholar." Gossett, Segal & Smith, supra, at 7. Pound's 1906 views, understood in their his-
torical context, suggest that he might have been an enthusiastic supporter of the civil rights
advances after World War II. See Higginbotham, The Priority of Human Rights in Court
Reform, in THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE, supra, at 87.
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power.
SINCE 1938: MISCHIEF AND MAGISTRATES
Like a proud ship, the Rules also age. Some kinds of reforms
are helpful and necessary to sustain the vitality of the original pro-
cedural design., The best of these is the federal magistrate. But
other kinds of "reforms" have been pursued by the detractors of
open, streamlined, equity-based procedure. The last fifty years
have witnessed persistent attempts, some successful, to tinker with
the Rules, to restrict their breadth, to re-erect barriers and hurdles
in the paths of litigants, and to re-localize procedure.
Special rules of pleading have been developed to discourage
certain kinds of cases, such as habeas corpus, civil rights, antitrust,
securities litigation, and now RICO claims.28 The general climate
has turned against broad discovery and the "big case."29 New sanc-
tions are now entrenched in the Rules, 30 replacing judicial atten-
tion to the merits with judicial coercion and punishment, and re-
flecting our deteriorating trust in the integrity of our colleagues at
the bar."' Local rules have been adopted to please local judges and
28 See Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 447-50 (1986); Subrin, supra note 5, at 984. Note that rule 9
has always required specificity for allegations of fraud.
29 See, e.g., Lundquist, The Climate has Changed-Will the Dinosaurs Survive?, in
NEW AMEADMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 110 (P. Rothstein ed. 1983);
The Rise and Fall of the Class-Action Lawsuit, N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1988, at B7, col. 3
(reporting that federal class actions have fallen from over 3,000 in 1975 to 600 in 1987 and
that, consequently, "use of the courts as a vehicle for social change has subsided").
30 FED. R. CIv. P. 11; see Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 558,
566-576 (E.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd as modified, 821 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S.
Ct. 269 (1988); G. VAIRo, REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON AMENDED RULE 11 OF THE
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (Sept. 1987); Cavanagh, Developing Standards Under
Amended Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 499, 511-14
(1986).
21 For a discussion of the deteriorating trust in the bar and in judicial solutions to
disputes, see generally Resnik, supra note 13.
In our view, requests for sanctions have not improved the quality of litigation and have
impeded the resolution of primary cases. See, e.g., Margolick, At the Bar: Has the Profes-
sion's Attempt to Curb Ludicrous Litigation Actually Boomeranged?, N.Y. Times, Mar. 11,
1988, at Bl, col. 1 (suggesting that satellite disputes over sanctions have created more
wasteful litigation than the sanctions have deterred). Margolick further queried: "Will there
come a case in which counsel files a Rule.11 motion against another Rule 11 motion that he
violated Rule 11? It seems only a matter of time." Id. at col. 2. Within a month of this
query, the court in Vallejo v. Webb, No. 82 Civ. 4825, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 1988),
granted rule 11 sanctions for violation of rule 11 in the opponent's original rule 11 motion.
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practitioners at the expense of strangers.32 These and other
changes have combined to shift the balance in favor of defendants
and the status quo.
The one innovation since the 1938 Rules that has been the
most helpful in meeting new strains is the creation of, and sub-
stantial delegation of power to, federal magistrates. The old United
States commissioners had the power to try certain petty criminal
cases, issue search and arrest warrants, set bail, and conduct some
limited criminal pretrial proceedings." In 1968, Congress replaced
the commissioners with the much more powerful magistrates. 4 To-
day's magistrates have all the powers of the old commissioners,
and in addition perform numerous other roles such as supervising
discovery, calculating attorney's fees, estimating damages, holding
arraignments, mediating settlements, and selecting juries. Congress
left the actual assignment of powers and duties to magistrates to
be determined by the individual federal courts. 5 In the Eastern
District of New York, where there is a remarkably able and dedi-
cated group of magistrates, 8 the district judges have delegated as
22 Local rules are authorized by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83. See, e.g., GENERAL,
CIVIL, CRIMINAL, ADMIRALTY AND MAGISTRATE PROCEEDINGS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS
FOR THE SOUTHERN AND EASTERN DISTRICTS OF NEW YORK (effective Oct. 26, 1983) (contain-
ing, inter alia, nine local "General Rules" and 46 local "Civil Rules"); cf. Holloway v. Lock-
hart, 813 F.2d 874, 880 (8th Cir. 1987) (finding local rule clearly in conflict with FED. R. Civ.
P. 34(b) and invalidating local rule).
Individual judges' own rules have also proliferated. See, e.g., NEW YORK STATE BAR
ASSOCIATION COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL COURTS, REPORT ON UNIFORMITY AMONG INDIVIDUAL
JUDGES' RULES IN THE EASTERN DISTRICT (Aug. 16, 1988); NEW YORK STATE BA ASS'N, INDI-
VIDUAL JUDGES' RULES, PROCEDURES AND FORMS IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS FOR
THE SOUTHERN, EASTERN, NORTHERN AND WESTERN DISTRICTS OF NEW YORK (2d ed. 1986).
Unrestricted local rule making frustrates the purpose of national rules. See C. WRIGHT,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 407 (4th ed. 1983). A superb project to
review the huge outpouring of local rules, standing orders, and policies, with the thought of
controlling them, has been undertaken under Dean Coquillette's direction at Boston College
Law School. See Workbooks, Conference on Local Rules in the Federal District Courts
(Nov. 12-13, 1987 at Boston College Law School) (sponsored by Judicial Conference of the
United States).
23 See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, THE SELECTION AND AP-
POINTMENT OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATES 2 (1987) [hereinafter SELECTION AND
APPOINTMENT].
2" See Federal Magistrates Act, Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1107 (1968) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-39 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
"5 See 28 U.S.C. § 636 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); SELECTION AND APPOINTMENT, supra
note 33, at 2.
26 See Kohn, U.S. Magistrates: A Boon to Judicial Administration, N.Y.L.J., May 31,
1988, at 1, col. 1 (commending magistrates in the Eastern and Southern Districts of New
York).
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much power to the magistrates as possible.
The magistrate, and occasionally a special master, can be of
great assistance in federal practice. Judges may refer almost any
matter to magistrates under section 636 of title 28 of the United
States Code. Although some dispositive motions may not be re-
ferred for actual determination by the magistrate, they may be re-
ferred for report and recommendation to the district judge.3 7 Mag-
istrates may also act as special masters and, once specially
designated, may try cases with the consent of the parties.3 8 Using
all these avenues, a district judge may rely on an experienced mag-
istrate for substantial assistance, particularly in complex cases re-
quiring extensive work on nondispositive matters."
Because we are concerned here with civil procedure, the mag-
istrate's function to be lauded most is the supervision of discovery.
Discovery under the original, quite permissive Rules sometimes
needs monitoring lest it be used improperly.40 One of the drafters'
37 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (1982); see, e.g., Wesolek v. Canadair Ltd., 838 F.2d 55, 56
(2d Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal of complaint based on magistrate's report).
11 See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(2) (1982) (serving as special masters); 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1)
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (trying cases); see also United States v. Kallash, 785 F.2d 26, 27 (2d
Cir. 1986) (affirming in part conviction obtained in jury trial before magistrate). See gener-
ally C. SERON, THE ROLES OF MAGISTRATES: NINE CASE STUDIES (Federal Judicial Center
1985); C. SERON, THE ROLES OF MAGISTRATES IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS (Federal Judicial
Center 1983); Kaufman, Masters in the Federal Courts: Rule 53, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 452
(1958); Peterson, Federal Magistrates Act: A New Dimension in the Implementation of
Justice, 56 IOWA L. REV. 62 (1970); Silberman, Masters and Magistrates Part I: The English
Model, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1070 (1975); Silberman, Masters and Magistrates Part II: The
American Analogue, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1297 (1975); Weinstein, Standing Masters to Super-
vise Discovery in the Southern District, New York, 23 F.R.D. 36 (1959) [hereinafter Wein-
stein, Standing Masters]; Zavatt, The Use of Masters in Aid of the Court in Interlocutory
Proceedings, 22 F.R.D. 283 (1958).
"9 There are limits to the "additional" duties that magistrates may be delegated pursu-
ant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) (1982). See Minerex Erdoel, Inc. v. Sina, Inc., 838 F.2d 781, 786
(5th Cir. 1988) (magistrates may not be referred determination of attorneys' fees on appeal
from bankruptcy court decision); United States v. Ford, 824 F.2d 1430, 1438 (5th Cir. 1987)
(magistrates may not select juries in felony cases), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 741 (1988); Note,
The Federal Magistrates Act: Are Defendants' Rights Violated When Magistrates Preside
Over Jury Selection in Felony Cases?, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 783 (1988). But see United
States v. Garcia, 848 F.2d 1324, 1329 (2d Cir. 1988) (permitting magistrates to select juries
in felony cases).
"o The Rules contemplate that much of the pretrial litigation will be run by "the law-
yers themselves" without "full judicial control," Weinstein, Standing Masters, supra note
38, at 38, and this less-supervised stage may permit some misconduct. There are, however,
some inherent features of the bar which tend to limit discovery abuse, even in the absence
of judicial monitoring. See Setear, The Barrister and the Bomb: The Dynamics of Coopera-
tion, Nuclear Deterrence, and Discovery Abuse (Mar. 1988) (Working Paper No. 75 at Civil
Liability Program of the Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy, Yale Law
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fears was that wide-ranging discovery might be used by one party
to "blackmail" the other into settling.41 Such so-called "discovery
abuse" is actually quite limited in the real world. About half of all
federal cases involve no discovery at all, and the cases in which
"abuse" actually occurs in the Eastern District are quite few.42 At-
torneys are essentially trustworthy, and federal judges usually per-
ceive and restrain potential abuse before it takes place. Discovery
run by magistrates is one of the best methods for such judicial
control.
Magistrates who are given full power to manage discovery can
do so exceptionally well. In the Eastern District, they will fre-
quently meet with the parties when that is desirable. They are con-
stantly available for telephone conferences. In one extremely com-
plex case in our court, the magistrate met almost daily with the
attorneys to shepherd the discovery process.43 Magistrates become
experts at arranging schedules, deciding discovery disputes and
preventing them, identifying improper requests and improper re-
fusals to produce, and generally smoothing out the discovery phase
of the litigation.
In the Eastern District of New York, we have institutionalized
the use of magistrates in the discovery phase for nearly every civil
case.44 Much of this reform was carried out as a result of a special
School). Given attorneys' self-restraint and a healthy dose of control by a magistrate, abuse
is quite manageable. See J. Weinstein, What Discovery Abuse? Comments on John Setear's
"The Barrister and the Bomb" (Apr. 8-9, 1988) (unpublished paper delivered at the Confer-
ence on Issues in Civil Procedure: Advancing the Dialogue, Program on Civil Liability, Yale
Law School); see also Resnik, supra note 13, at 548-49 (discussing discovery abuse in gen-
eral, and the attempts at solution in Eastern District of New York).
," See Subrin, supra note 5, at 978.
42 This figure is based upon extensive research conducted by Professor Margaret Berger
of Brooklyn Law School (publication forthcoming).
'3 The case was In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, MDL 381 (E.D.N.Y.
1985). See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liability Litig., 104 F.R.D. 559, 562 (E.D.N.Y.
1985) (magistrate's Pretrial Order No. 33, dated Dec. 17, 1984) ("Protective Orders Opin-
ion"), aff'd, 821 F.2d 139 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 344 (1987); Scheindlin, Discover-
ing the Discoverable: A Bird's Eye View of Discovery in a Complex Multidistrict Class
Action Litigation, 52 BROOKLYN L. REV. 397 (1986) (authored by magistrate who conducted
much of the Agent Orange discovery).
" See STANDING ORDERS OF THE COURT ON EFFECTIVE DIScOVERY IN CIVIL CASES, UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICr OF NEW YORK (effective Mar. 1, 1984, as
amended Feb. 27, 1987). The original 1984 orders were published at 102 F.R.D. 339 (1984),
along with the Revised Report of the Special Committee on Effective Discovery in Civil
Cases for the Eastern District of New York to the Honorable Jack B. Weinstein, Chief
Judge, 102 F.R.D. 357 (1984). The 1984 Orders and Revised Report, as well as the 1987
Amendments and the 1986 Report of the Discovery Oversight Committee to the United
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committee of outstanding members of the bar chaired by Edwin J.
Wesely. Professor Edward D. Cavanagh of St. John's University
School of Law played a critical role in this work as reporter to the
committee. Professor Jeffrey Sovern of the same law school was
also of great assistance. As in many other instances, the court is
grateful for the support of St. John's and Dean Patrick J. Rohan in
markedly improving the work of our court.
Pursuant to a "standard referral order" used in the Eastern
District of New York, the judge usually sends the case to a magis-
trate for all discovery purposes. The magistrate conferences every
civil case early. The magistrates know they have full authority and
that the judges will give them appropriate deference should the
parties appeal an order. The parties are similarly aware that the
judges will not lightly disturb a magistrate's discovery order.45 The
magistrate reports to the judge on the conduct of discovery, so that
the judge is aware of any misdeeds by the parties. Discovery is
thus handled by experts, and the judges are freed to concentrate
on doing justice at dispositive motions and trials.46
Not surprisingly, this kind of arrangement was anticipated by
the original Advisory Committee drafting the Rules. At the group's
very first meeting, William Mitchell made the point that "care
must be taken to prevent [discovery] from being used as a basis for
annoyance and blackmail, and that possibly it is desirable to have
such proceedings conducted by a master or magistrate having
power to rule on questions in order to prevent abuse. 4 7 This is the
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, are available in pamphlet form
from the Office of the Clerk of the Eastern District of New York.
In concert, the pamphlets set out the system for conducting discovery. The court has
gone to lengths to design proper and productive discovery practices and to educate the bar
to those practices. We believe education to be a far more palatable and effective method for
improving litigation practice than coercion through sanctions.
" See, e.g., Update Art, Inc. v. Modiin Publishing, Ltd., 843 F.2d 67, 68 (2d Cir. 1988)
(affirming magistrate's decision to impose severe discovery sanctions). Judge Timbers began
his opinion for the court of appeals by noting: "The essential question presented by this
appeal is whether this United States Court intends strictly to enforce sanctions provided for
noncompliance with discovery orders. The opinion that follows is a stern warning that we
do." Id. Although widespread use of sanctions is not desirable, it is clear that once properly
ordered by a magistrate, sanctions should be enforced.
" The rapid addition of magistrates and non-judicial support staff has enabled the
American federal courts to keep pace with the increased caseloads without an inordinate
increase in the number of judges. See R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM
97 (1985); see also Chase, Civil Litigation Delay in Italy and the United States, 36 AM. J.
COMPAR. LAW 41, 53-56 (1988).
" Statement of W. Mitchell, Summary of Proceedings of the First Meeting, June 30,
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English practice,4 and it is the system we have adopted for our
District.
One must be skeptical about the claim that "discovery abuse"
is a serious problem in our courts. Perhaps "discovery abuse" is a
scare tactic soon to go the way of phrases such as "imperial activist
judges," "litigation explosion," "strike suits," "in terroram class ac-
tions," and other exaggerations designed to bar from the court-
house those litigants deemed unworthy of admission. Unfortu-
nately, each wave of catch-phrase scare tactics propagates new
amendments to the original Rules, further encrusting and slowing
down our procedural ship.
CONCLUSION
This fiftieth anniversary is a fitting time to congratulate the
reformers, conservative and liberal alike, who fought for and cre-
ated our Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This is not to say that
ours is the best of all possible worlds. There is much to be said for
a number of European systems. But any procedural system, if it is
to work effectively, must be adapted to local institutions and atti-
tudes. At the moment, our federal system still seems to meet that
requirement quite well. The complete overhaul of our civil system
in the 1930s was courageous, even daring, and yet it was accom-
plished with such skill and foresight that, despite some barnacles,49
1935, at 10 (July 3, 1935), quoted in Subrin, supra note 5, at 978 n.401.
"8 See Weinstein, Standing Masters, supra note 38, at 37-38; Zavatt, supra note 38, at
286-89. The Standing Masters article was originally given as a speech to the Second Circuit
Judicial Conference on September 13, 1958, while its author was the Reporter revising the
New York Practice into the New York Civil Practice Law & Rules (CPLR). The author's
study of the English master system, including first-hand observation in London, confirmed
his view that the system would be quite useful in the American federal courts, perhaps with
different discovery tracks for different kinds of cases. Although the master system was not
incorporated into the CPLR, upon the author's becoming Chief Judge of the federal district
court for the Eastern District of New York, he convened the judges, magistrates, and a
special committee to design the system of magistrate-run discovery now in operation in that
district. One member of the original Eastern District committee, Professor Margaret Berger
of Brooklyn Law School, is currently conducting an intensive study of this system. In addi-
tion, the use of magistrates to supervise discovery was much discussed at the National Con-
ference Commemorating the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
held at Northeastern University School of Law, Oct. 7-8, 1988 (proceedings and papers to be
published shortly in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review) (see especially remarks of
Judges Posner and Weinstein, favoring use of magistrates, and of Professor Silberman,
counseling caution and accountability). For a general discussion of the English system, see
materials cited supra note 38.
"1 The analogy between undesirable tinkering with the Rules and barnacles on a ship
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the main structure of the 1938 Rules remains graceful, enduring,
and resilient.
was perhaps first drawn by Judge Charles Clark himself. See Clark, Two Decades of the
Federal Civil Rules, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 435, 445 (1958) (recognizing the need to "strip[]
away the barnacles" every so often).
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